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11.1  Introduction 
In the last 15 years, U.S. portfolio lending abroad has passed through 
a series of stages. After 1970 a period of inactivity first gave way to a 
surge of bank lending, followed by the development of debt-servicing 
difficulties and finally the curtailment of foreign lending. To a surprising 
extent, the recent rise and retreat of foreign lending resembles previous 
historical  episodes in  which  surges of foreign lending were abruptly 
terminated  by waves of default, only to start up again after a lull of 
several decades. This chapter studies the last such complete episode- 
the “debt cycle” through which the U.S. economy passed in the four 
decades following World War I-to  see what light it sheds on recent 
developments in international capital markets. 
11.2  The Debt Cycle of the 1920s 
The forces underlying the debt cycle of the 1920s were set in motion 
by  World War I. The war transformed the United  States from a net 
debtor to a creditor nation: between 1914 and 1919, largely as a result 
of loans floated on behalf of the French and British governments, Amer- 
ica’s net debtor position was extinguished and replaced by a net creditor 
position of comparable magnitude (see table 11.1). There followed a 
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237 Table 11.1  International Investment Position of the United States 1897-1939  (Excluding War  Debts) ($ billions) 
End of Year 
Item  End of 1897  1 July  1914  1919  1930  1933  1939 
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Sources: Lewis (19381, Lary (1943), U.S. Department of  Commerce, Historical Statistics of  the United States (1976). 
Note: All  data for 1919 and data for 1929 on foreign long-term investments in the United States are unofficial estimates; other 
data are as estimated  by the Department of  Commerce. 
a1929 data.  CIncludes  miscellaneous investments. 
b1934 data.  dNet debtor position. 239  The U.S. Capital Market and Foreign Lending 
surge in peacetime lending, mainly by the United States, matched pre- 
viously only by the United Kingdom in the period 1900-13.  That lend- 
ing reflected a combination of factors: continued rapid growth of  the 
U.S. economy, the wartime rise in saving, and the demand for capital 
to reconstruct the devastated European economies. 
Yet  in  the immediate aftermath of  World  War  I, the international 
capital  market  remained  becalmed.  It is true  that changing rates  of 
return played some role in the reignition of U.S.  foreign lending; figure 
I  1.1 shows how, compared to domestic medium-gra& bonds, the return 
on foreign medium-grade bonds rose steadily from the early 1920s until 
1928. But rates of return by themselves account for little of the variation 
in the volume of foreign lending. The role of other factors, specifically 
risk, is especially evident before  1924, when U.S. investors were vir- 
tually unwilling to lend to foreigners at any price. The risks of lending 
were most evident in the case of Central Europe. So long as the value 
of  their  reparations obligations remained  uncertain,  it  was not clear 
that the nations of  this region possessed the resources to service ad- 
ditional external debt. So long as their financial systems remained in 
disarray, it was not clear that they were capable of  mobilizing those 
resources they possessed. The initiation of lending required League of 
Nations intervention in the form of stabilization loans and assistance 
in carrying out fiscal and monetary reform. 
Yet  the perception that foreign lending was risky was not limited to 
Central Europe. At the beginning of the 1920s, lending to Latin America 
also remained depressed (table 11.2). Here the dominant factor was 
the  depressed  level  of  world  trade  and  uncertain  prospects  for  its 
recovery, which cast doubt over the  capacity of  foreign debtors to 
generate export revenues. The initiation of lending required substantial 
steps  to  reconstruct  international  trade  and  international  financial 
EL 
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Fig. 11.1  Relative interest rates and foreign issues, 1922- 1929 240  Barry Eichengreen 
Table 11.2  Distribution of American Foreign Security Issues, 1919-29 
(percentages of total, total in millions) 
Total in 
Constant 
Year  (%)  (%)  (%I  (%)  ($m)  ($m real) 
1919  60.3  30.4  8.9  0.2  377.5  259.6 
1920  51.5  38.2  10.1  0.0  480.4  334.4 
1921  26.2  32.5  38.6  2.5  594.7  580.5 
1922  29.5  23.5  31.2  15.6  715.8  704.3 
1923  26.1  29.0  27.7  17.0  413.3  391 .O 
1924  54.7  15.7  19.4  9.9  961.3  934.7 
1925  58.9  12.8  14.8  13.2  1,067.1  983.0 
1926  43.5  20.3  33.1  2.8  1,110.2  1,056.4 
1927  44.2  18.1  26.0  11.5  1,304.6  1,299.3 
1928  48.0  14.8  26.5  10.5  1,243.7  1,221.3 
1929  21.5  44.0  26.5  7.8  658.2  658.2 
Europe  Canada  Latin America  Asia  Total  I929 Prices 
Source: Computed from U.S.  Dept. of  Commerce, American  Underwriting of  Foreign 
Securities  (various issues). The final column deflates the current  price total by  U.S. 
wholesale prices, from U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of  the United 
States (1976). 
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding. 
arrangements. If  a  lesson  is to be drawn from the initiation  of  this 
earlier debt cycle, it is that an existing debt overhang and threats to 
an open trading  system can dam the flow of  resources to potential 
borrowers, and that outside intervention  by governments or interna- 
tional institutions may be required to restart it. 
In the 1920s as in the 1970s, the surge in foreign lending was greatly 
stimulated  by  financial  innovation.  American  investors acquired  fa- 
miliarity with the merits of foreign bonds  through  the Liberty Loan 
campaign of World War I. Banks enlisted in that campaign established 
or expanded their bond departments. Still others established security 
affiliates to engage in the entire range of  bond market activities. Once 
the  Federal  Reserve Act  relaxed  restrictions  on foreign branching, 
member banks began to move abroad. The growth of the investment 
trust enabled the small investor to participate in the market. Together, 
the rapid development of retailing and underwriting activities and the 
proliferation of investment vehicles provided organizations and indi- 
viduals both the incentive and the opportunity to increase their par- 
ticipation in foreign bond markets. 
11.3  Pricing Foreign Bonds 
How did foreign lending  operate once it  was  again underway? A 
standard criticism of  the international  capital market in the 1920s is 241  The U.S.  Capital Market and Foreign Lending 
that it failed to discriminate adequately among borrowers. This same 
criticism has been leveled at U.S. lenders in  the 1970s, providing the 
motivation for studies of  the pricing of foreign bonds (Guttentag and 
Herring  1985). These modern studies provide a benchmark for com- 
parison with my  analysis of the bond market in  the  1920s. I analyze 
the determinants of the yield to maturity on a pooled time series-cross 
section of some 200 categories of foreign bonds issued in the United 
States  between  1920  and  1929.  (Complete  results  are  reported  in 
Eichengreen, vol. 1, chap. 3 of this project.) I find a positively sloped 
yield  curve and a relatively high  risk premium on foreign corporate 
bonds. While both results are consistent with standard models, inter- 
estingly they contrast with the findings of other investigators for the 
1970s (Edwards  1986).  I  also find that  the  lowest  risk  premia  were 
consistently charged to Scandinavian countries, members of the British 
Commonwealth, small Western European countries, and small Central 
American republics economically or politically dependent on the United 
States, confirming that national reputation and political considerations 
played a role in the pricing of foreign bonds. But there is little evidence 
that lenders took into account current economic policies in borrowing 
countries, or that they charged higher premia for larger loans. It would 
seem that reputation more than current economic developments influ- 
enced bond market participants. 
This  analysis provides  some  evidence  that  lenders discriminated 
among  potential  borrowers  on the  basis  of  reputation  and  political 
factors that conveyed information about the probability of default. But 
did they discriminate  adequately? To  address  this issue  I  specify a 
simple model of ex ante and ex post returns. The expected rate  of 
return on risky loans, ir, should exceed the risk-free rate, 4, by a risk 
premium: 
(1)  i,  = if  + 6a 
where u  is default risk so 6u is the premium on risky loans. Ex ante 
(of  default) the return on risky loans exceeds that required: 
(2)  i ex  anrr  = ir + Pa 
where i ex 
from that required by investors by their expectational error, E. 
(3) 
Substituting and solving for the ex post return gives 
is the ex ante rate of  return. The ex post return differs 
ie,  post  = i,  + E. 
(4) 
If  investors’ expectational errors have mean zero, in  a regression of 
ex post on ex ante returns the constant term 242  Barry Eichengreen 
should be positive and the coefficient on i,,  should be greater than 
unity. 
Using the ex ante and ex post rates of return calculated by Eichen- 
green and  Portes  (1986) for a  sample of  SO  dollar  bonds (national, 
provincial,  municipal, and corporate) issued in the United States be- 
tween 1924 and 1930, equation (4) can be estimated, yielding 
(5)  i,,  = 9.00 - 120.59  i,,  NnfP 
(0.94)  (0.89) 
N  = 50  R2 = 0.016 
with t-statistics in parentheses. Although the constant term is positive, 
the coefficient on ieX  is less than unity, which is inconsistent with 
the  joint hypothesis of rational expectations and market efficiency. That 
coefficient can  be  interpreted  to mean that  investors  systematically 
underestimated the cost of default on those bonds most at risk, incom- 
pletely incorporating differential default risk into the spreads they de- 
mand of foreign borrowers. 
If default risk was imperfectly perceived at time of issue, bondholders 
still could have recognized and acted upon it subsequently. I therefore 
examine the pricing of these same foreign bonds after 193  1. Naturally, 
the suspension of service is reflected in the prices of defaulting bonds. 
But in addition it is evident in the prices of continuously serviced bonds, 
as illustrated  by  the  implicit  expected  capital  losses (probability  of 
default times capital loss in  the event) on three Scandinavian bonds 
considered in figure  1 1.2. This suggests that default carried negative 
externalities creating doubt about the creditworthiness even of  coun- 
tries maintaining service on their external debts. 
11.4  Default and Market Access 
Approximately  two-thirds  of  foreign securities held  by  American 
investors fell into default over the course of  the Depression decade. 
Contemporaries were  convinced that  the experience had  a lingering 
impact on the attitudes of American investors. One way to approach 
this issue is to compare U.S. foreign lending in the ten years imme- 
diately succeeding World Wars I and 11. Clearly, the second half of the 
1940s and the first half of  the 1950s constitute a special period in the 
history of the world economy, following as they do a global war. But 
the years 1919-28 are an equally special period for many of the same 
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Fig. 11.2  Implicit expected capital losses: Scandinavian bonds 
that U.S. capital exports actually were larger in  the second postwar 
decade than in  the first (table 11.3). The difference is due, however, 
almost entirely to unilateral transfers by governnat, notably the Mar- 
shall Plan. Moreover, the real value of portfolio lending fell dramatically 
between the decades following World Wars I and 11,  by more than 80 
percent. This is precisely what one would expect had purchasers been 
deterred by interwar experience with default. 
This decline in portfolio lending could reflect either a general dis- 
enchantment  with  foreign loans  or a  special inability to borrow by 
countries with a recent history  of default. While consistent country 
data on the extent of  total foreign borrowing after World War  I1 are 
notoriously difficult to obtain, reasonably consistent data on stocks of 
debt in 1945, 1950 and 1955 are available courtesy of Avramovic (1958). 
In the raw data, no relationship between default in  the 1930s and bor- 
rowing after 1945 is apparent. But reputational effects are only a subset 
of the factors affecting a government's willingness and ability to borrow 
abroad. Standard borrowing models advance country size, the share 
of  imports in domestic consumption, and export variability as addi- 
tional determinants of foreign borrowing.  My  analysis of  the role of 
these factors and of past debt-servicing records in  the extent of  bor- 
rowing in the post-World War I1 decade builds on the Avramovic data 
as supplemented by  United Nations and International Monetary Fund 
documents and annual reports of bondholders' protective committees. 
Table 11.4 reports cross-section regressions for 32 countries, of which 
18  are Latin American. The dependent  variable is terminal  stock of 
debt of the public authorities. Indebtedness is positively related to GNP, 
the import share, and the initial stock of debt, as anticipated. But there 
is no evidence that the severity of interwar default, as measured by 
the share of debt in default in  1935, was negatively related to ability Table 11.3  U.S. Foreign Lending in the Two Postwar Decades, 1919-28  and 1946-55  (In millions of current dollars for 1919-28  and 
in 1919-28  average prices for 1946-55.) 
1919  1920 
Public, long- and short-term  2,328  175 
Private 
Direct, long-term  94  154 
Other, long-term  75  400 
Short-term  n.a.  n.a. 
Unilateral transfers 
Private  832  634 
Government  212  45 
1921  1922 
-30  -31 
1923 
-91 
1924  1925  1926  1927  1928  Decade Average 
-28  -27  -30  -46  -49  217 
111  153 
477  669 
n.a.  n.a. 
450  314 






182  268  351  351  558  237 
703  603  470  636  752  502 
109  46  36  349  231  142 
339  373  361  355  346  433 
25  30  20  2  19  49 
1946  1947  1948  1949  1950  1951  1952  1953  1954  1955  Decade Average 
Public, long- and short-term  2,705  3,079  690  462  106  96  265  139  -59  197  682 
Private 
Direct, long-term  206  546  486  468  424  311  537  469  425  523  444 
Other, long-term  -114  36  47  57  338  268  135  -118  204  153  107 
Short-term  278  137  78  -133  102  63  59  -107  404  121  97 
Unilateral transfers 
Private  603  497  470  377  310  258  279  321  321  290  368 
Government  2,015  1,416  2,580  3,620  2,430  1,904  1,315  1,262  1,131  1,299  1,871 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States (1976,  198-201,  866-67). 
Notes: n.a. indicates not available. Decade average short-term capital flow for the twenties is for the years 1923-28  only 245  The U.S. Capital Market and Foreign Lending 
Table 11.4  Determinants of the Stock of Debt, 1955 (Dependent variable is in 
millions of U.S. dollars.) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Log of Debt  Level of Debt  Log of  Debt  Level of  Debt 
Constant 
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Source: See text. 
Nore; t-statistics in parentheses. 
to borrow between 1945 and 1955. There is no evidence that countries 
which defaulted in the interwar period found it more difficult to borrow 
in the immediate post-World  War I1 years. 
While the Avramovic data have the virtue of consistency, they have 
the problem of combining all external debt of governments, whether 
extended by international agencies, creditor country governments, or 
private  investors. It would  be advisable to analyze private  portfolio 
lending (to both public and private sectors) separately from lending by 
public  agencies before concluding that no trace of  interwar defaults 
can be discerned in the geographical distribution of postwar lending. 
This can be done for private portfolio lending to the Latin American 
countries, for which the United Nations (1965) has published estimates. 
Table  11.5 reports a regression analysis of these data. The bivariate 
relationship between postwar portfolio borrowing and interwar default, 
shown in the first column, is positive but statistically insignificant. Once 246  Barry Eichengreen 
Table 11.5  Determinants of Private Portfolio Capital Inflow to Latin 
American Countries, 1946-55  (The dependent variable is in 
millions of U.S. dollars.) 
Constant 
Share of debt in default. 1935 
GNP 
Import/GNP ratio 
Debt in  1945 
Export variability 
Number of observations 
R2 
F 






















-  17.63 
(0.86) 
0.01 










Source: See text. 
Note:  t-statistics  in parentheses. 
other correlates of the demand for debt are added to the equation, the 
coefficient  on  interwar debt turns negative,  as the reputational  hy- 
pothesis would predict, although it is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero at standard confidence levels. Once again, it is impossible to reject 
the null hypothesis that variations across countries in the severity of 
interwar default had essentially no impact on access to  private portfolio 
capital during the postwar years. 
The finding of a much reduced  volume of private portfolio lending 
and the finding of no greater difficulty of borrowing for countries that 
defaulted  previously  are not  difficult  to reconcile  with  one another. 
Recall that interwar default translated  into expectations of significant 
capital losses on the bonds of even those countries which continued 
to service their debts. This suggests that some effects of interwar de- 
faults were external to the initiating country, consistent with the con- 
clusion that the main legacy of interwar debt default was to depress 
the volume of private portfolio  lending generally,  not to divert it to 
faithful servicers from countries which lapsed into default. 247  The U.S.  Capital Market and Foreign Lending 
11.5  Conclusion 
What picture of the capital market emerges from this study of  the 
United States’ first 35 years as a creditor nation? It is impossible to 
characterize the market as either perfectly rational or wholly irrational. 
Advocates of  a return to the bond  market  as a panacea for recent 
difficulties with  sovereign lending should take note of  these conclu- 
sions. While switching from bank loans to the bond market may divert 
some  of  the  risk  shouldered  by  creditor-country  banking  systems 
(Eichengreen and Portes 1987), bond market participants have shown 
no greater facility than have bank loan officers historically in distin- 
guishing good credit risks from bad. Nor were bond markets any more 
successful  in  smoothing  the  flow  of  capital  to  developing-country 
debtors. 
What picture of the legacy of default for the subsequent behavior of 
the capital market emerges from this study of the last complete debt 
cycle? Recent theoretical studies of  sovereign lending in the presence 
of  potential default (Eaton and Gersovitz  1981) have posited the ex- 
istence of a default penalty, usually interpreted as the costs of reduced 
capital market access. The finding that, compared to countries which 
maintained debt service throughout, countries which lapsed into default 
in the  1930s were no less able to borrow  in the  1940s and  1950s, is 
difficult to reconcile with this simple view. If there were costs of default, 
they did not take the form of  differential credit-market access in the 
first postwar decade. But this does not imply that default was costless. 
Evidence from  bond  prices  in  the  1930s and from  the  volume and 
composition of  lending in the  1940s and  1950s suggests that at least 
some of the costs of default spilled over among debtor countries. These 
costs took the form of reduced access to private portfolio capital flows 
for defaulting and nondefaulting countries alike. 
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